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Jnterparty Competition and Redisbihution:
Theme and Variation
(>

R. FRY
Universi,ty af South Carolina

BRIAN

Probably the most thoroughly scrutinized linkage in the literature
on public policies in the American states is the relationship between
interparty competition and policy outcomes. The results of the various
analyses have been largely negative. Regardless of the policy arena
employed , interparty competition has failed to reveal the expected relationships with public policies. No convincing associations have been
demonstrated between interparty competition and such outputs as levels
of aggregate state revenues and expenditures, levels of functional categories of state revenues and expenditures, financial centralization, progressive taxation, governmental expansion, policy innovation, and the
oongruence between public opinion and public policies in the American
states.1 It is possible, of course, to challenge the validity of the measures
of interparty competition and public policies employed in these analyses
or the statistical tests of the relationships. 2 However, the consistently
negative findings over a relatively broad range of policy outputs suggests that a reconceptualization of the relationship between interparty
competition and public policy is in order-indeed overdue.
In this study, we propose to re-examine the influence of interparty
competition on public policy in the American states in an area in which
such an influence is most commonly predicted-namely,
the redistributive configuration of state revenues and expenditures. Further, we shall
• I wish to thank Professors Heinz Eulau, Hubert Marshall, and William Paisley
for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I also wish to express my
gratitude to the Hoover Institution on War , Revolution, and Peace for its financial
support of this project.
1
Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the
American States (Chicago: Rand McNallr,, 1966); John G. Gramm, "Structural Determinants of Legislative Policy Outputs, ' paper delivered at Conference on Measurement of Public Policies in the American States, Ann Arbor, July 28 to August 3,
1968; Jack L. Walker , "The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States,"
American Political Science Review, LXIII, 3 ( September, 1969), 880-99; Frank
Munger, "Opinions, Elections, Parties, and Policies: A Cross-State Analysis," paper
delivered at the Sixty-fifth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 2 to 6, 1969.
2
See John H. Fenton and Donald Chamberlayne, "The Literature Dealing with
the Relationship Between Political Processes, Socio-Economic Conditions, and Public
Policies in the American States: A Bibliographical Essay," Polity, I, 3 ( Spring, 1969 ),
388-404 for a more positive interpretation of the research findings.
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propose an alternative conceptualization of that relationship as well as
an alternative view of the nature of party influence on public policies.
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PARTY CHARACTERISTICS AND REDISTRIBUTION
Much of the research involving the linkage between interparty competition and public policy has been based upon the hypotheses developed by V. 0. Key in his analysis of Southern politics. 8 Key reasoned
that the loose, factional politics he observed in several Southern states
did not operate, as some had assumed, as functional equivalents of political parties. The difference is that factions present neither continuing
organizations nor identifiable groups of like-minded politicians to be held
accountable for governmental actions or lack thereof. On the other hand,
political parties possess both attributes. The consequences of a continuing organization and identifiable groups of politicians are that issues
become a more prominent feature in the electoral process and parties
must extend their appeal to a broader range of the electorate. In Key's
words: "When two distinct groups with some identity and continuity
exist, they must raise issues and appeal to the masses if for no other
reason than the desire for office."~ Key's reasoning is that electoral
competition in a system marked by factional politics is likely to be based
on idiosyncratic or personality factors rather than issues since the electorate doesn't know whom to hold responsible for what. Party politics
produces a clearer recognition of the "ins" and the "outs ," and the electorate is better able to determine which rascals to throw out. Finally,
Key suggests that competing partisan organizations will work to the advantage of the ''have-not" elements of society, specifically in the form
of state fiscal policy:

. . . Politics generally comes down, over the long run, to a conflict
between those who have and those who have less. In state politics
the crucial issues tend to turn around taxation and expenditure.
What level of public education and what levels of other public services shall be maintained? How shall the burden for their support
be distributed? ...
It follows that the grand objective of the haves is obstruction, at
least of the haves who take only a short-term view. Organization
is not always necessary to obstruct; it is essential, however, for the
promotion of a sustained program in behalf of the have-nots,
although not all party or factional organization is dedicated to that
8
4

V. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1949), Ch. 14.
Ibid. , p. 304.
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purpose. It follows, if these propositions are correct, that over the
long run the have-nots lose in disorganized politics.~

In sum, Key argues that interparty competition leads to an extension
of effective suffrage, which leads to issue delineation, both of which
result in a better break for the relatively disadvantaged portion of the
population. It should be pointed out that Key's observations were limited to the South and he was discussing gross differences between oneparty and two-party systems. The empirical tests, on the other hand,
have dealt with a broader range of states and are concerned with degrees of interparty competition rather than the presence or absence of
such competition. The extension of Key's reasoning to the broader case
is problematical and may account for the difficulties in achieving his
hypothesized results.
Another view of interpar:ty competition with decidedly different
policy implications has been presented by Anthony Downs. 6 Downs
bases his analysis on the presumption that voters are able to place political parties on a continuum ranging from extreme conservatism to extreme liberalism. Voters are arranged along a similar continuum. Voters
will choose that party closest to their own position along the liberalconservative continuum. Voters evaluate the position of a party on the
basis of policy stances which that party takes, their party affiliation being determined by the voters' overall evaluation of party stands on
various issues.
The nature of party competition, according to Downs, will be determined by the shape of the distribution of the electorate along the
liberal-conservative continuum. If this distribution is bimodal or multimodal, there are likely to be two or more political parties with fairly
well-defined stands corresponding, roughly, to the several modes of public attitudes. If, however, the distribution is unimodal, both parties will
try to locate themselves as close as possible to this single modal position.
The parties move to the center in order to appeal to more voters and do
so with the assurance that they will not lose many supporters at the
tails of the continuum since even these voters are likely to choose the
lesser of two evils. 7
In other words, while Key was arguing that interparty competition
is likely to produce appeals to the tails of the yoter distribution as parIbid., p. 307.
Anthony Downs, An Eccmcmic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and
Row, 1957), Ch. 8.
7
Downs does say that if the extreme voters seek to affect electoral outcomes
in the ~ture or if they cannot distinguish between the two parties, they may defect
or abstam.
0
6
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ties seek support from previously unrepresented sectors, Downs reasons
that competing parties will gravitate toward the middle of the continuum where the bulk of the votes resides. New voters may alter the
location of the apex of the continuum, but, unless they enter in large
numbers, the unimodal character of the distribution is not likely to be
altered.
The consequence of party movement to the center is that parties
become more alike in their stands on policy. Thus party competition,
assuming a unimodal distribution of the population, leads to issue obfuscation rather than, as Key hypothesized, issue delineation. Further,
Downs asserts that a unimodal distribution of public opinion is likely
in a stable democracy since a radical departure from that configuration
will lead to conflict, violence, and instability.
Now, if we assume that interparty competition actually blurs issues
rather than clarifying them, it follows from Key's line of reasoning that
the resulting confusion among the voters will make it difficult for them
to choose rationally between parties on the basis of their own self-interest and thus interparty competition will not have the redistributive
impact which Key foresaw. The crucial link in Key's chain of reasoning
is that interparty competition will produce issue-based politics calculated to give the party broader appeal. In the Downs model, parties
are similarly motivated ( i.e., they seek to gain broad support); however,
the means for achieving this end are to adopt policy stands closer to the
mode and, since the opposing party is behaving in the same manner,
closer to the stands of the opposing party. 8
Thus we can find some theoretical foundation for predicting substantially different policy consequences in terms of redistribution as the
result of interparty competition. 9 Key predicts redistribution in the
favor of lower income groups as a system moves from one-party factional
politics to two-party, issue-oriented politics. An extension of Downsian
logic suggests less redistribution due to the policy confusion emanating
from a situation in which two par-ties are competing for the same space
on the political continuum.
As a final variation on a theme, we can entertain the almost heretical notion that party dominance rather than interparty competition is
related to the redistributive configuration of state revenues and expendi8 See Donald Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," American Political
Science Review, LVII, 2 (June, 1963), 368-77, for an incisive critique of Downs'
general theory.
9 Much the same distinction between
Key and Downs has been drawn by
Cnudde. See Charles F. Cnudde, "Public Opinion and State Politics," in Robert Crew
(ed.), State Politics (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1968), pp.
165-84.
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This notion is based on the common-sense proposition that it is
not the mechanics of interparty competition but the programmatic predilections of the party in power which determine the nature of state
:fiscal programs. Accordingly, we can assume that dominance by the
Democratic party will be associated with redistribution in favor of the
lower income classes due to the public stance of that party in favor of
such programs-at least relative to the public stance of the Republican
party. This conception of party stands is, of course, a gross over-simplification of a complex situation given the overlapping nature of the
ideological continuum in the two major parties. However, it provides
us with a rudimentary device for the examination of a plausible alternative to the interparty competition thesis.
ures.10

MEASURES OF REDISTRIBUTION
The measures of redistribution employed in this study represent a
revised and extended version of an index of redistribution developed in
an earlier analysis.11 Briefly, that index was based on an allocation of
revenue burdens and expenditure benefits to nine income classes in each
state derived from a study by the Tax Foundation. 12 The analysis yields
a ratio of expenditure benefits to revenue burdens for each income class
in each state. These ratios provide the basis for the present analysis, but
there are three significant changes from the previous analysis. First,
we shall employ four summary measures of redistribution rather than
the single measure employed in the previous analysis. Second, intergovernmental revenues and expenditures have been excluded from this
analysis in an effort to isolate that portion of state revenues and expenditures most susceptible to statewide political influences. Third, the
eleven states of the Confederacy are e,ccluded from analysis to avoid
ambiguity in the interpretation of the party variables.
The four summary measures of redistribution are: the summed
benefit-burden ratio for the three lowest income classes ( less than
$4,000) in each state , the summed benefit-burden ratio for the middle
10 Measures of party dominance , somewhat surprisingly, have received considerably less attention than measures of interparty competition. And, where they have
been employed, they have achieved only indifferent empirical success. Dye and
Fredlund, Hymans , and Morss found little independent relationship between measures of party dominance and measures of public policy. Alt, in his study of English
and Welsh county boroughs, however, discovered some differences based upon party
control. See Dye, op. cit., pp. 239-46; Eric J. Fredlrmd, Saul Hymans, and Elliott
Morss, "Fluctuations in State Expenditures: An Econometric Analysis," Southern
Ecorurmic Journal, XXXIII, 2 (April, 1967), 496-517; and J. Alt, "Some Social and
Political Correlates of County Borough Expenditures," British Journal of Political
Science, I, 1 (January, 1971 ), 49-62.
11
Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," American Political Science Review, LXN, 2 (June, 1970) 508-22.
12
Tax Foundation, Inc., Tax Burdens and B~ts
uf Government Expenditures
by Income Class, 1961 and 1965 (New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 1967).
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four income classes ( $4,000-$9,999) in each state , the summed benefitburden ratio for the two highest income classes ( $10,000 and over) in
each state , and the slope of the benefit-burden ratio for each income
class regressed on a numeric al designation of the income class ( See
Table I).
TABLE I. Dependent Variahles by State (1961)
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The first summary measure of redistribution, the summed benefitburden ratio for the three lowest income classes, reflects net benefits
accruing to the lowest income classes in each state as the result of the
fiscal policies adopted by the state.
The second and third summary measures of redistribution, the
summed benefit-burden ratio for the middle four income classes and the
two highest income classes reflect net benefits of state fiscal policies for
those groups. The addition of these variables permits us to examine the
possibility that there are different determinants of state redistributive
efforts in various income groupings. For instance, the benefit-burden
ratio for the middle income classes can be employed to investigate the
hypothesis that measures of party chariacteristics have an influence on
the benefit-burden ratio of the middle income groups while failing to
have such an effect on the ratio for the lowest income groups.
The fourth measure employed, the slope of the benefit-burden ratio
regressed on a numerical representation of income class, is also an indicator of redistribution in favor of the lower income classes. This variable was constructed by assigning numbers 1 through 9 in ascending
order to each of the nine income classes for each state. Regression analyses were run between the assigned numbers and the benefit-burden ratio
for each income class in each state. The slope of the regression line
measures changes in the benefit-burden ratio as one progresses up the
income scale. A negative slope means that the benefit-burden ratio decreases as income increases. To the extent that the descent is monotonic
and linear, the regression slope accurately measures directional redistribution in favor if the lower income classes. If the descent departs
from linearity or monotonicity, the measure will be less accurate, which
should be reflected in a reduced proportion of variance accounted for
by the numerically designated income classes.
The correlation between income class designation and the benefitburden ratio ranges from .38 in Nebraska to .87 in New York, which
means that income class designation accounts for between 14% and 75%
of the variances in the riatios in each non-Southern state. Income class
designation accounts for at least 50% of the variation in 31 of the 37
non-Southern states with the median amount of variance accounted for
standing at 58%. In six states 70% or more of the variance in benefitburden ratios is accounted for. These statistics indicate that there is a
relatively good fit between income class designation and the benefitburden ratios, which, in tum, means that the regression slope variable
can be interpreted in most states with confidence that it actually reflects
redistribution in favor of the lower income classes. The measure is also
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consistent in that the slope is negative for all states, indicating that the
ratios generally decrease as income increases.
The regression slope has two advantages over the summed ratio for
the three lowest income groups as a measure of redistribution in favor
of the lower income classes. First, this measure is not dependent on an
arbitrary selection of income classes to be examined. The regression
slope measures directional redistribution throughout the income range.
Second, the summed ratio for the three lowest income classes may be
higher than the ratio for any other income grouping in a particular state,
but the degree of advantage may vary considerably among the states.
The regression slope indicates the relative degree of advantage while
the summed ratio for the three lowest income classes may reflect only
absolute advantage. It is probably best to interpret the summed ratio
for the three lowest income classes as a measure of the treatm ent of
the lowest income classes among the states while the regression slope
is a more accurate measure of the relative treatment of the lower income classes within each state.
The inter-correlations among the four dependent variables are relatively low. Only two of the seven rela-tionships exceed .50. The two
cases of high inter-correlation are the relationship between the benefitburden ratio for the three lowest income classes and the regression slope
and the relationship between the benefit-burden ratios for the middle
and upper income classes. All these variables have been retained in the
subsequent analysis in spite of these high inter-correlations beca use the
interaction of these variables with other variables in the analysis differs
in a theoretically significant manner.
CAVEATS
Several limitations in the construction of the dependent vari ables
should be kept in mind in interpreting the results of this analysis. First,
the Tax Foundation study upon which our measures of redistrib ution
are built, focused on the aggregate redistributive consequences of state
revenues and expenditures rather than state-by-state estimates. The
method used mutes variations in redistributive impac t among the states
due to such factors as differential spending habits, size of the income
classes, and structural differences in revenue and expenditure programs.18 Second, the shifting and incidence assumptions for both reve13 See Bernard H. Booms and James R. Halldorson, "The Politics of Redistribution: A Reformation," American Political Science Review, LXVII, 3 ( September,
1973) (forthcoming), for a revised version of the benefit-burden ratio for the three
lowest income classes which adjusts for income class size. We have not used the
suggested revision because adjusting for income in the dependent variable definitionally inflates the relationships between income and income-related variables and the
dependent variable.
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nue and expenditure categories can be challenged. Third, the exclusion
of intergovernmental revenues and expenditures has a differential effect
in the various states which tends to be associated with the size of the
benefit-burden ratios. In states where intergovernmental revenues exceed intergovernmental expenditures, the benefit-burden ratios will be
higher ceteris paribus, than in states where intergovernmental expenditures ~xceed intergovernmental revenues. Thus, the dependent variable
contains a component which is only tangentially related to the item of
concern in this analysis-Le., differences in redistributive patterns produced by the relative dependence of each state on various revenue
sources and expenditure programs.
In short, we make no pretense that the measures of redistribution
employed in this analysis are definitive. Rather, we consider them a
legitimate point of departure for the analysis of an important dimension
of state policies.

MEASURES OF PARTY CHARACTERISTICS
A multitude of measures of interparty competition have been constructed relating to a variety of offices and time periods. Our strategy,
while selective, was to use several measures of interparty competition
in an effort to avoid potentially artif actural results.
In selecting the variables to be used in this analysis, we first excluded measures not dealing with statewide offices. This criterion excludes mist measures dealing with national contests and some measures
which deal only with state legislatures. Next, we grouped the measures
of interparty competition according to the dimension of pa11ty competition with which they were concerned. Two general categories were
used in this process-the closeness of the election and the actual sharing
of office.
The first category includes indices of minority paJ.1tysupport expressed as a percentage of the total vote received by the minori-ty party
and/ or the percentage of the seats in a sta,te legislature held by the
minority party. The specific measures in this category are: Ranney's
index of the percentage of the vote received by the minority party candidate for governor and the percentage of the seats held by the minority
party in the state legislature for the period 1938 to 1958; 14 Hofferbert's
measure of the percentage of the vote received by the minority party
u Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N.
Vines (eds.), Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1965), pp. 61-99.
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candidate for governor for the period 1932 to 1962; 16 Pfeiffer's measure
of the percentage of the vote received by minority party candidates for
statewide offices and by all minority party candidates for the U. S. House
of Representatives between 1940 and 1964; 16 and Fenton's index consisting of the sum of the percentage of the vote received by the minority
party candidate for governor and the percentage of the seats in the state
legislature controlled by the minority party between 1946 and 1948.17
The measures of shared control have somewhat more internal variation. The first measure which we call "minority party success" is based
on Hofferbert's compilation of the percentage of the time the minority
party in a state controlled the governorship between 1932 and 1962.18
The second measure, also derived from the Hofferbert index, relates to
a pattern of alternation in office and is based upon the percentage of
gubernatorial elections in which the winning party was different from
the incumbent party in each state for the period between 1932 and
1962.19 The final measure of party sha1ing is divided party control. Here
we use Key's index which measures the percentage of the time in which
the governorship and one or both of the houses of the state legislature
were in the control of opposing parties for the period between 1931 and
1952.20
To explore the programmatic dimension of party behavior, we can
make some minor alterations in available indices of interparty competition to transform them into measures of party dominance. We shall use
three such measures: the average support for the Democratic candidate
for governor and the percentage of the seats of each house of the state
legislature controlled by the Democratic party for the period between
1938 and 1958 ( based on the Ranney index) ,21 the average support for
Democratic candidates for all statewide offices and Democratic candi16 Richard I. Hofferbert, "Classification of American State Party Systems," Journal of Politics, XXVI, 3 (August, 1964), 550-67. There are missing values for all of
the Hofferbert measures for Kansas, apparently as the result of an oversight in his
classification scheme. Values are also missing for Fenton's measure of minority party
support and Key's measure of divided party control for Nebraska and . Minnesota.
These states were omitted in the measures because legislators in both states are
elected on a nonpartisan basis. Ranney's index uses only gubernatorial elections in
assigning scale values to these states. The other indices do not use measures of
competition in the legislature. Missing values were deleted pair-wise. That is, if a
value is missing for any state for a particular variable , the computation excludes that
state. However, if other variables are available for the same state, that state will be
included in all computations for which variables are available.
1 a David G. Pfeiffer, "The Measurement of Inter-Party
Competition and Systemic Stability ," American Political Science Review, LXI, 2 (June, 1967), 457-67.
1 1 John H. Fenton , People and Parties in Politics ( Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, and Co., 1966), p. 34.
1s Hofferbert, op. cit.
10 Ibid.
20 V. 0. Key, Jr., American State Politics (New York: Knopf, 1956), p. 55.
21 Ranney, op. cit.
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dates for the U. S. House of Representatives for the years 1940 to 1964
(based on the pfeiffer index), 22 and a classification by Schlesinger based
on the number of elections for governor won by Democrats and the
number of elections in which there was no party change for the period
from 1870 to 1950.23 The various measures and their components are
summarized in Table II.
TABLE n. Summary of Measures of Party Characteristics
Components
Category
JNTERPARTY COMPETITION:
Closeness Measures
% vote for minority party candidate for
Ranney-Minority
governor and % of seats in both houses
Party Support
controlled by minority party
% vote for minority party candidate for
Hofferbert-Minority
governor
Party Support
% vote for minority party candidates for
Pfeiffer-Minority
statewide offices and % vote for minorParty Support
ity party candidates for U. S. House of
Representatives
% vote for minority party candidate for
Fenton-Minority
governor and % of legislative seats held
Party Support
by minority party
Sharing .Measures
% of gubernatorial elections won by
Hofferbert-Minority
minority party
Party Success
% of gubernatorial elections in which
Hofferbert-Party
winning party differed from incumbent
Alternation
party
% of time period in which governorship
Key-Divided Party
and one or both of legislative houses
Control
controlled by different parties
PARTY DOMINANCE:
% vote for Democratic candidates for
Ranney-Support
for
governor and % of state legislative seats
Democratic Party
held by Democrats
% vote for Democratic candidates for
Pfeiffer-Support
for
statewide offices and U. S. House of
Democratic Party
Representatives
% of elections won by Democratic canSchlesinger-Support
didates for governor and duration of
for Democratic Party
Democratic party control

Time Period

1938-1958
1932-1962
1940-1964

1946-1948

1932-1962
1932-1962
1931-1952

1938-1958
1940-1964
1870-1950

We shall examine three hypotheses concerning the relationship between party variables and state redisrributive efforts. Using Key's
analysis as a point of departure, the following hypotheses will be
considered:
Pfeiffer, op. cit.
Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying States
According to Degree of Inter-Party Competition," American Political Science Review
XLIX, 4 (December, 1955), 1122.
'
22
23
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1. Party closeness measures will be positively associated with state

redistributive efforts in favor of the lower income classes and
negatively associated with the benefit-burden ratios for the middle and upper income classes.
2. Party sharin g measures will be positivel y associated with state
redistributive efforts in favor of the lower income classes and
neg atively associated with the benefit-burden ratios for the middle and upper income classes.
The above measures of party ohariacteristics are both ways of viewing interparty competition. Key was most concerned with the sharin g
measures since the process of the "outs" replacing the "ins" results in
rewards for different constituencies and a redistributive effect. This
process is best measured by minority party success, alternation in office,
and, to some extent, divided party control. The closeness measures are
not exactly what Key had in mind, but they can be interpreted as measures of the degree of threat to the major party which may make it more
responsive to the interests of a broader constituency.
In regard to the party dominance measures , we suggest the following hypothesis:
3. Democratic party support will be positively associated with stat e
redistributive efforts in favor of the lower income classes and
negatively associated with the benefit~burden ratios for the middle and upper income classes.

This hypothesis, obviously, represents the opposite side of the coin. It
suggests that the programmatic inclinations of the party in power rather
than the mechanical factor of competition will produce redistri butive
fiscal policies in favor of the lower income classes.
FINDINGS
Table III presents ,the zero order correlations between interparty
competition and party dominance and the four measures of redistribution."
From the standpoint of the interparty competition hypothese s, the
relationships can best be described as confusing. All of the correla tions
in this table are negative. These results are in accord with the hyp oH Some of the variables in this analysis have been transformed to achieve a
more "normal" distribution and to avoid distortions in the reported correlations. The
transformations involved do not force normal distributions because of possible nonmonotonicity in the transformation process. Relatively simple transformations ( e.g.,
X8 or XGo) were employed to bring the correlations within acceptable limits.
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TABLE m

Zero Order Correlations Between Party Closeness, Party Sharing, and
PartY Domfuance Measures and Redistribution Variables

J.nterparty Competition
Closeness Measures
Ranney-Minority Party Support
Hofferbert-Minority Party Support
(Trans.)
Pfeiffer-Minority Party Support
Fenton-Minority Party Support
(Trans.)
Sharing Measures
Hofferbert-Minority Party Success
Hofferbeit-Party
Alternation
Key-Divided Party Control (Trans.)
Party Dominance
Ranney-Support for Democratic
Party (Trans.)
Pfeiffer-Support for Democratic
Party
Schlesinger-Support for Democratic
Party

-.20

-.21

-.3()a

-.13

-.10
-.2sa

-.11
-.46b

-.24
-.5lb

-.04
-.11

-.08

-.22

-.37 8

-.00

-.5()b
-.14
-.18

-.28"
-.20
-.24

-.20
-.22
-.33a

-.431>
-.10
-.13

.14

-.42b

-.39b

.28a

.14

-.50b

-.48b

.soa

.17

-.28"

-.23

.26

a Indicates

signillcant at .05 level
b Indicates significant at .01 level

theses regarding the middle and upper income classes, but directly
opposed to the hypothesis that higher levels of interparty competition
result in higher net benefits for the lower income classes. The magnitide of most of the relationships is moderate to weak. Only nine of the
twenty-eight coefficients of correlation reach the .05 level of significance
and six of those correlastions involve the benefit-burden ratios for the
middle and upper income classes where the gap between revenues and
expenditures produced by the exclusion of intergovernmental revenues
and expenditures has a major influence on the size of the ratios. The
negative relationships across the board and the relatively low magnitudes of those relationships suggest that no income class benefits consistently from higher levels of interparty competition.
On the other hand, the measures of Democratic party dominance
describe the predicted patterns of relationship. Each measure of Demo-
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cratic party dominance is positively associated with both measures of
redistribution in favor of the lower income classes and negatively associated with the benefit-burden ratios for the middle and upper income
classes. Once again , however , the relationships between party dominance and the measures of redistribution in favor of the lower income
classes are moderate to weak and should be interpreted with some caution. Only two of the six coefficients of correlation attain the .05 level
of significance. While the correlations for the benefit-burden ratios for
the middle and upper income groups are considerately higher ( five of
the six are significant at the .05 level), the ambiguity produced by the
exclusion of inter governmental revenues and expenditures renders the
findings somewhat suspect.
There is always the possibility, of course, that other variables are
either obscuring the expected relationships or that other variables actually account for those observed relationships. It is not possible to consider all the alternatives , but we can take a step in that dfrection by
examining a few obvious possibilities which threaten the validity of our
findings. One particulary pregnant possibility is that levels of socioeconomic development account for the observed relationships. Levels of
socio-economic development are closely associated with levels of interparty competition and it is quite likely that this association alters the relationship between interparty competition and state redistributive efforts.
In addition, one would expect that levels of socio-economic development
could significantly influence all of the correlations involving the benefitburden ratios since income is negatively correlated with levels of intergovernmental revenues. Intergovernmental revenues ( as well as intergovernmental expenditures) have been excluded from this analysis and
that exclusion may produce negative relationships between income-related variables and the benefit-burden ratios. We shall institute further
controls for income distribution, electoral participation, and liberal partisanship to counter some additional potential threats to the validity of
our initial findings.
The control procedure employed is partial coefficients of correlation.
This is not an ideal device , but one necessitated by the small number of
cases (states) available for analysis. We shall not institute simultaneous controls given the difficulties of interpreting high order partials, but
we shall examine the controls sequentially. The control variables are:
a factor score 25 for level of socio-economic development comprised of
median family income, industrialization, urbanization (percentage of
25

The factor analytic procedure employed was a principal components analysis

in which the diagonals are unaltered and factors are extracted without rotation.
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the population living in standard metropolitan statistical areas as defined by the Bureau of the Census) ,26 and the reciprocal of the Cini
index of income inequality; 27 the percentage of a state's population
participating in gubernatorial and senatorial elections in nonpresidential years between 1962 and 1960 ( electoral participation) ;28 the percentage of a state's population wi.th income of less than $4,000; the
percentage of a state's population with incomes of $4,000 to $9,999; the
percentage of a state's population with incomes of $10,000 or more; 29
and the percentage of a state's population claiming an ideological identification who identify as "liberals " ( liberal partisanship). 30
We can also simplify the analysis considerably by factoring the
measures of interparty competition and Demociiatic party dominance
since each set of variables proves to be internally consistent and both the
patterns and the magnitudes of the relationships between each set of
variables and redistribution have proven to be generally similar. Principal components factor analysis yields factors which account for 63%
of the variance among the interpa:rty competition vaiiables and 84% of
the variance among the party dominance measures.
The oon:elations between the interparty competition and the Democratic party dominance faotors and the redistribution measures on both
a controlled and an uncontrolled basis are shown in T,able IV. The zero
order correlations between the two factors correspond to both the patterns and magnitudes of the correlations observed in the separate analyses for each variable. The interparty competition factor has a negative
relationship with all of the measmes of redistribution and only the correlation between the interparty oompetition faotor and the benefitburden ratio for the highest income groups reaches the .05 level of
significance. The party dominance factor, as hypothesized, is positively
associated with both measures of redistribution in favor of the lower
income classes and negatively associated with the benefit-burden ratios
28 Income, industrialization, and urbanization figures are taken from U. S. D~
partment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, U. S. Census of the Population, 1960
(Washington, D. C.; U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 1-288, 1-249.
27
David Verway, "A Ranking of States by Inequality Using Census and Tax
Data," Review of Economics and Statistics, XLVIII, 3 (September, 1966), p. 314.
28
Lester W. Milbrath, "Politica l Participation in the States," in Herbert Jacob
and Kenneth N. Vines, op. cit., p. 40.
29
U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract
of the United States, 1964 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office,
1964), p. 341.
80
This measure was provided by Ronald E. Weber of Indiana University. It
~as derived from estimates from small state samples by use of the procedure devised
m the Simulmatics Project. For a detailed report of the procedures employed, see
Ronald E. Weber, Anne H. Hopkins, Michael L. Mezey, and Frank J. Munger, "A
Methodology for Estimating State Policy Preferences" ( unpublished paper).
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TABLE IV. Zero-Order and Partial Correlations Between Interparty Competition
and Party Dominance Factors and Redistribution Variables
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Control for Economic Development
Interparty Competition Factor
Party Dominance Factor
Control for Economic Development
and Electoral Turnout
Interparty Competition Factor
Party Dominance Factor
Control /or Economic Development
and% o State's Population with
Incomes less than $4,000
Interparty Competition Factor
Party Dominance Factor
Control /or Economic Development
and% o State's Population with
Incomes of $4,000--$9,999
Interparty Competition Factor
Party Dominance Factor
Control /or Economic Development
and% o State's Population with
Incomes of $10,000 or more
Interparty Competition Factor
Party Dominance Factor
Control for Economic Development
and Liberal Partisanship
Interparty Competition Factor
Party Dominance Factor
a
b
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<l)i:c;

i
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Zero-Order Correlaticns
Interparty Competition Factor
Party Dominance Factor

ti

~ti

i:x:i~J

i:x:i~-St:

i:x:i~'S

C::i:ti

-.28
.16

-.27
-.44b

-.s7a
-.40b

-.20
.31•

-.20
.20

.04

-.ssa

-.24

-.4$1>

-.24
.22

-.21
-.s1a

-.20
-.29

-.19
.29

-.13
.11

.02
-.34a

-.05
-.31•

-.15
.21

-.20
.22

.06
-.28

-.02
-.28

-.22

-.14
.24

.18
-.42b

-.ssa

.06

-.19
.35-

-.18
.23

.12
-.44b

-.01
-.42b

-.21
.34•

Factor
.13

.82•

Factor

Factor

Factor

.soa

Factor

Factor

Indicates significant at .05 level.
Indicates significant at .01 level.

for the middle and upper income classes. Three of the four correlations
between the party dominance factor and the measures of redistribution
are significant at the .05 level.
Moreover, none of the controls instituted ,appreciably change the
picture. All of the controlled relationships between the interpar,ty com-
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petition factor and the two measures of redistribution in favor of the
lower income classes are negative in contrast to Key's contention that
higher levels of interparty competition would accrue to the benefit of
the lower income classes. None of the correlations reaches the .05 level
of significance indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
interparty competition is unrelated to the level of net benefits for the
lower income classes. The pattern of ,the relationships between interparty competition and the benefit-burden ratios for the middle and upper
income classes is mixed. Only five of the twelve relationships are
negative ( the direction hypothesized), but none of the correlations is
signillcant at the .05 level. These data all suggest that interparty competition is unrelated to the redistribitive configuration of revenues and
expenditures in the American states.
The controlled relationships between party dominance and redistribution are almost identical to the zero order relationships between
those variables. All of the correlations between party dominance and
the two measures of redistribution in favor of the lower income classes
are positive , as hypothesized. However, only four of the twelve correlations are significant at the .05 level and all of these involve the
regression slope measure. Thus the evidence that Democratic party
dominance is associated with some downward shift in net benefits
resulting from state fiscal policies is stronger than the evidence that
those benefits reach the lowest income classes. The controlled relationships between Democratic party dominance and the benefit-burden
ratios for the middle and upper income classes are all negative, as
hypothesized, and nine of the twelve partia,I con-elations are significant
at the .05 level.
Our data, then, present fairly strong support for the contention
that the programmatic dimension of party control is more closely related
to the redistributive configuration of state revenues and expenditures
than is the mechanical factor of interparty competition. We submit two
qualifications to this geneml finding . First, Democratic party dominance
apparently results in redistribution in favor of the lower income classes,
but the evidence is not convincing that these benefits reach the lowest
income classes. Second, there appears to be some asymmetry in the
effect of Democratic party dominance. The evidence that Democratic
party control works to the disadvantage of the middle and upper income
classes is much stronger than the evidence that Democratic party control
works to the advantage of the lower income classes.
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CONCLUSION
This study bas examined contrasting conceptualizations of interparty competition and contrasting images of the nature of party influence
on the redistributive configuration of state revenues and expenditures.
In regard to int erparty competition, we have contrasted hypotheses
drawn from the works of V. 0 . Key and Anthony Downs. The data
indicate that, regardless of the measure of interparty competition employed or the statistical controls invoked, the empirical relationships
between interparty competition and redistribution fail to support the
Key hypothesis that interparty competition will lead to more redistribution in favor of the lower income classes. Without controls, no income
class seems to benefit from interparty competition. Indeed, all income
groups appear to be at a relative disadvantage in a competitive partisan
environment. With controls, the pattern for the lower income groups is
the same, but the pattern for the middle and upper income groups is
mixed. To add to the confusion, the strength of the relationships is, for
the most part, quite low. These results are in direct contrast to Key's
proposition that interparty competition is associated with redistribution
in favor of the have-nots or at least the extension of that thesis beyond
the Southern states . Both the pattern of ,the relationships and the
strength of those relationships are far more compatible with Downs'
assertion that interparty competition will lead to issue obfuscation with
the result that every income class finds it difficult to use the system to
its own advantage.
In regard to the contrasting images of the nature of party influence
on state redistributive efforts, we have contrasted the hypothesized
effects of interparty competition and the hypothesized effects of Democratic party dominance. This effort should be considered little more
than a tentative probe into the programmatic predilections of political
parties, but the results are at least minimally encouraging. The pattern
of the relationships between Democratic party dominance and redistributive efforts is consistently in the direction predicted. Democratic
party dominance works to the advantage of the lower income classes
and to the disadvantage of the middle and upper income groups. However, the weakness of the relationships between Democratic party
dominance and redistribution in favor of the lower income classes
suggests that either the salience of the redistributive component of state
fiscal policies in regard to partisan politics in the American states is
rather low or that som&-as yet untapped-characteristic
of the political
parties will reveal the proper associations.

